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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The writing of this thesis began with a simple insight: more than 90% of the clients of the startup I am 
the CEO of were acquired at events and tech conferences. The company name is Panda Training and it 
was founded in March of 2016. After a few changes in the strategy and the product we still work 
primarily in the 'HR Tech' or HR Technology space which means that most of our clients are from the 
Human Resources department, change management steering groups or are managing related issues. 
The service we currently provide is a scalable coaching solution that allows companies to follow up on 
training and change management programs to increase their effectiveness and collect qualitative data 
on their progress. 
 
For any startup client acquisition is tough and we are no exception. For a while, we have been focusing 
on cold calls but being a new venture with no brand, being young, and not having any social capital 
certainly weren't helpful. The client acquisition process often relies upon trust (Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Hawes et al., 1989; Prus, 1989; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Swan & Nolan, 1985) and trust is hard to 
build without any reputation of social capital. Our track record shows that a short (often, 15-20 
minutes meeting) is more likely to turn into a sale than a 1-hour meeting following a cold call or an 
engagement with 850 followers over the social media channels. One of the factors that could influence 
this outcome is the emergence of the new networking apps that allow people to schedule the meetings 
for the upcoming conference beforehand. Conference participants can then comfortably come to a pre-
assigned table and discuss business with the other counterpart. This approach gives conferences an 
edge from a simple numbers perspective: you are able to send a huge amount of meeting invitations 
and end up with more meetings in a day than you could end up with were you doing cold calling for a 
month. Due to the fact that the potential clients have to accept the meeting invitation, the system acts 
as a filter of quality: people who accept the startup's invitation are already interested. That being said, 
there might be more at play from a trust-building perspective: for example, the institutionalization of 
trust towards entrepreneurs at tech conferences and events, the hype and excitement of the conference 
atmosphere and associated positive feelings, or the face-to-face nature of the encounter.  
 
Our startup's experience suggests that (a) events and tech conference could be a great channel for client 
acquisition, and (b) it is currently underutilized. Underutilization of events and tech conferences by 
entrepreneurs is important because in their core startups are businesses that are trying to find a 
sustainable business model. To achieve that objective they heavily depend on sales and client 
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acquisition and it is often a way bigger struggle than building a product. In the absence of good client 
acquisition channels or pre-existing trusting relationships, entrepreneurs are left guessing if the root 
cause of the startup's lack of growth is indeed the lack of demand for their product, or simply 
suboptimal marketing and sales strategy. The distinction between the two is crucial as the former 
means that the startup needs to change its product and that, likely, a problem they are trying to solve 
doesn't exist while the latter means that they need to find more effective client acquisition channels, 
which is often a lot easier.   
 
Given these circumstances, the core research questions for this thesis are: 
● Why might events and tech conferences work better than cold calls or social media as a client 
acquisition channel for new ventures whose entrepreneurs are young or are entering an industry 
they do not know?  
● Why is it that short personal contact so important for establishing the trust required for the 
client to place their first order? 
 
I would, therefore, want to start by exploring the existing literature on startup client acquisition with 
the purpose of understanding the playing field it offers for entrepreneurs, then go deeper in the 
direction of trust and see how the two subjects interact, and especially how our understanding of trust 
could affect our understanding of tech conferences and events as a channel for client acquisition. 
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2 STARTUP CLIENT ACQUISITION: LITERATURE REIVEW 
 
Existing research into startup client acquisition is quite scarce. There are nonetheless many tangential 
subjects that have been explored that are relevant to review for this paper. A big chunk of client 
acquisition research is on the relationship aspect of sales. I will review the literature on this concept 
briefly in order to analyze if it offers any value to our inquiry. The main idea behind relationship sales 
is that salespeople need to change their priorities from paying the most attention to influencing buyer 
behavior to a more 'sales partner' role where the main task becomes conflict mitigation and prevention 
(Weitz & Bradford, 1999). The reasoning behind it is the following: companies start prioritizing long-
term relationships over short-term sales. Weitz and Bradford say that this kind of relationship 
marketing is called a new marketing paradigm and it's based on the thinking that relationships 
constitute a strong competitive advantage which is becoming more critical with every passing day as 
the market becomes more crowded. This change is, of course, influencing how firms do every aspect 
of sales management from sales and marketing to training and recruitment.  
 
It's hard to imagine how relationship marketing relates to startups though since, while they also care 
for the long-term outcomes, short-term sales are often a higher priority for them since the primary 
startup objective is to build a business model, experiment and move fast past products that don't have 
any customer demand. This desire to move fast has crystallized around the 'lean startup' movement. 
Lean startup is a methodology described by Eric Ries (2011) in his book 'The lean startup: How 
today's entrepreneurs use continuous innovation to create radically successful businesses'. Its roots can 
be traced from Toyota's 'lean manufacturing' documented in the book by Womack, Jones, and Roos 
(2007) 'The Machine That Changed the World'. Lean manufacturing is a methodology that strives to 
eliminate as much 'waste' (the expenditure of resources for any goal other than the creation of value for 
the end customer) from the production process as possible by optimizing the production process. Lean 
startup is different, the aim is to optimize the learning process of the company and find the product that 
satisfies customer demand by experimenting fast. Ries advocates the learning loop which consists of 
building a part of the product, measuring its success, learning from the data and pivoting or continuing. 
This logic makes lean startup methodology inherently short-term and risky at every turn since there is 
no commitment to continuing with the same product at any time. Of course, a startup following the 
lean startup model might still benefit from relationship marketing if the client relationship allows a 
startup to experiment with them again and again without losing the trust of the customer. 
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A number of researchers explored the notion that the relationship built with the client is part of the 
provided value as well (Haas et al., 2012; Hohenschwert & Geiger, 2015). How relationship value is 
built by the salespeople has been explored too. One model cites combining of resources from both 
parties, soliciting and interpreting customer voices, facilitating interactions and extracting value from 
them, and, finally, bringing parties on the same page in regards to the subjectivity of the value 
provided (Haas et al., 2012). Authors conclude that, while the value of sales in relationship value has 
long been confirmed, their framework could be a step in the direction of understanding the mechanics 
of the relationship value building and enable us to equip the future generations of salespeople with the 
needed structures and strategies.  
 
Another paper has relied on two bodies of research, the B2B marketing literature on value creation in 
sales and the research on sales influence tactics, to explain how relationship value is created by the 
salespeople (Hohenschwert & Geiger, 2015). The authors define that most of the salespeople's 
behavior is directed towards changing, strengthening or expanding customers’ value perceptions. They 
write that most of the B2B companies 'neglect the existence of value in the customer’s perception that 
lies in the interpretation of interpersonal interactions and fall into the trap of objectivity that suggests 
all value to be identified, documented and communicated'. The importance of the subjective perception 
of value is no exception in the startup world, too. 
 
Now, how does the relationship marketing influence our understanding of the question behind the 
client acquisition at conferences and tech events? I would argue that, while in its essence conference 
client acquisition strategy is very short-term and doesn't strive to keep up with the old relationships, 
the sales relationships can be turned into long-lasting client relationships after the acquisition. In this 
regard, cold calling is similar in its tactics while social media can be called more relationship-oriented. 
The question though is whether the long-term orientation of social media is worth it for a startup that's 
trying to experiment and move fast. I would argue that no, considering the lean startup approach in 
most cases short-term client acquisition is more important for startups, while the long-term client 
relationships can be adjusted along the road. 
 
Let's now look at other parts of the client acquisition literature. Beyond the relationship marketing, 
some research has focused on the fundamentals of marketing and sales success. For example, 
innovation and branding have been investigated as the most probable reasons for marketing success 
and consequently the financial success of companies (Merrilees et al., 2011). The authors concluded 
that innovation was a bigger factor, but both factors have been strong contributors. This, too, is aligned 
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well with the lean startup methodology that puts a high priority on innovativeness and the culture of 
'move fast and break things'. Nowadays innovation and branding are considered a given for any startup 
and thus it can't be treated as a separate channel for client acquisition and as such doesn't influence our 
research question. 
 
The relevance of B2B marketing research has been questioned by practitioners during the last 20 years. 
Looking at the future of B2B marketing, one paper has proposed a framework of 6 relevant topics for 
the upcoming research: innovation, customer journey and relationship value, data analytics, harnessing 
technology, marketing/finance interface and revenue growth, and industry context or ecosystem 
(Cortez & Johnston, 2017). This approach is also aligned with startup thinking, taking the more 
rational approach and focusing on a number of business aspects that are quantifiable, controllable and 
often data-driven with a flavor of service design on top while not even putting branding on the list. 
Once again, these approaches can't be treated as separate client acquisition channels, but rather serve 
as a way to optimize the marketing and sales process and thus don't affect our research question.  
 
Social media is, naturally, another big topic for research in the marketing and sales domains. The use 
of social media by salespeople has been found to enhance salesperson responsiveness and 
communication, which in turn has positively influenced customer satisfaction (Agnihotri et al., 2016). 
The fact that social media has been found to be an antecedent enhancing salesperson behaviors rather 
than a direct contributing factor to customer satisfaction, nonetheless, doesn't make it less important as 
a tool in the salesperson's arsenal. Moreover, the cheapness of social media makes it a highly attractive 
tool for startups that use it for stakeholder engagement, generating awareness, cultivating relationships, 
and development of new business (Chen et al., 2017). Social media is perhaps one of the biggest 
contenders for tech conferences as a client acquisition channel, and a very popular one among startup 
due to its cheapness and appeal to often young founders. But is it better as a client acquisition channel? 
Later I will try to explore this question.  
 
Finally, the research into trade shows, conferences, and industry events as a marketing channel and a 
good path towards client acquisition have been extremely scarce. Some old research points out that 
trade shows are a great, cheaper alternative to cold calling (Browning & Adams, 1988). Cheap, of 
course, is always very attractive to startups. The emergence of new non-equity related startup-
corporation collaboration models (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015) has likely made the supply of 
corporate representatives at events significantly higher, too, making it easier for startups to find 
potential clients at such events and conferences. Indirect positive impacts of events and professional 
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forums are also evident, for example, their impact on opportunity recognition by the entrepreneurs 
(Ozgen & Baron, 2007). The topic of the effectiveness of events and conferences as a startup client 
acquisition channel is especially interesting since the industry of trade shows and conferences has itself 
lately been subject to huge changes with a new type of tech conferences like Slush in Helsinki and 
technological innovation like conference matchmaking apps, for example, Brella. 
 
To sum up, a big portion of client acquisition literature focuses on long-term relationship marketing 
and sales. For our purposes and within limitations of looking only at young startup entrepreneurs who 
are founding new ventures in new fields, this topic is not of utmost importance. There is also a portion 
of the literature that looked at the sales and marketing process and different attributes of how that 
process is managed. Since this paper is focused on the client acquisition channels, I won't the process-
oriented approach in-depth. The channel that the literature highlights is social media, and along with 
the cold calling, it will be the main comparison point with the conferences and tech events for us. Now 
let's look at trust literature and see if it brings clarity to the research question. 
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3 TRUST: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A number of authors have shown that trust is a crucial element of successful sales relationships 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Hawes et al., 1989; Prus, 1989; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Swan & Nolan, 1985). 
'Trust through safety, credibility, and security reduces the 
sacrifices for the buyer and is assumed to be of value by itself' (Selnes, 1998, p. 305). At the same 
time, relatively few studies have concentrated on how trust is built in entrepreneurship (e.g. Bergh et 
al., 2011; Neergaard and Ulhøi, 2006; Nguyen and Rose, 2009; Smith and Lohrke, 2008; Tillmar, 
2006). That's why, now that we have looked at the client acquisition literature, let's look at the 
literature on trust and highlight relevant interactions with client acquisition and entrepreneurship. The 
question I would like to explore is whether the trust would emerge quicker in certain circumstances 
(for example, at conferences and tech events), which could lead to a smoother and quicker client 
acquisition process.  
 
One widely accepted definition of trust is that trust is ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another’ 
(Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). As highlighted by Möllering (2006), at the heart of the concept of trust 
is the 'leap of faith', 'as-if attitude' of accepting vulnerability and uncertainty but acting as if nothing 
bad will happen. Möllering writes that ‘willingness to be vulnerable’ (Mayer et al., 1995) is related to 
optimistic, positive expectations and embracing vulnerability rather than avoiding or eliminating it, 
which makes trust different from other social processes.  
 
At the center of the book by Möllering (2006) and his research is the framework of trust that he calls 
'the wheel of trust', which is portrayed in Figure 1. In the center of the wheel is the trust itself, which 
through suspension ('leap of faith', 'as-if attitude', which we touched upon briefly in the previous 
paragraph) interacts with reason, routine, and reflexivity, the pillars of trust that are all contributing to 
trust and interacting with each other. In one of his papers, Möllering refers to trust and control as a 
duality, where each can't exist without the other and contributes to the relationship (Möllering, 2005). 
Suspension allows the actors to suspend the doubt and make the leap of faith towards increased control 
that might grow over time, to jump-start the vehicle of trust, to take the first step towards a process that 
could become self-reinforcing. Möllering (2006) emphasizes: 'It is not merely the case that trust rests 
on imperfect bases which leave a residual gap that needs to be crossed. Rather, by successfully 
crossing the gap, trust also validates those bases.' Suspension then is the irrational element that is like 
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the glue for the different elements of trust, making them work together without making trust arbitrary 
or trivial.  
 
 
 
In the discussion of suspension noteworthy is the notion of 'fiction of a reality in which social 
uncertainty and vulnerability are unproblematic' that Möllering (2006, p.112) brings to light. In his 
own words, 'the fiction co-produced by trustor and trustee remains a fiction, potentially a dangerous 
‘fake’, and it is ultimately still up to the trustor to suspend uncertainty and vulnerability'. Ortmann 
(2004) refers to a similar notion of 'fiction' saying that countless daily activities are only made possible 
because people behave as if certain things were true. Möllering explains that actors arrive at 
constructing this fiction by taking a hypothesis, some information that serves as a basis for trust and 
overinterpreting it, stretching it to 'serve as a springboard into uncertainty' (Luhmann, 1979, p. 33; 
Simmel, 1950). This points to the fact that trust or leap of faith can't be made from anywhere, but 
requires certain conditions.  
 
Some sources indicate that faith can be an attractive choice because it brings people the feelings of 
safety, comfort: 'It just makes you feel comfortable going through the process if 
you have confidence in the doctor', say some patients facing brain tumor surgery (Bernstein et al., 
2004). More than that, often the suspension doesn't happen in isolation and is enabled by the social 
networks and the support from other actors as trustors and trustees and embedded in relationships with 
each other (Brownlie & Howson, 2005; Brunetto & Farr-Wharton, 2007).  
 
Figure 1 - Möllering's (2006) model of trust. 
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Let's look at the 3 pillars of trust of Möllering's (2006) model and how they relate to other trust 
literature. The first one is the reason. A notion that trust is based on the rationality of the actors and 
that trusting behavior is rational. Looking at the research on trust in economics, it's clear that it's been 
dominated by exploring the rational choices of the actors and seeing actors as inherently opportunistic 
(Lindenberg, 2000). Opportunism is understood as (often, short-term) temptations of the actors to 
betray the trust agreements and exploit opportunities that would favor their personal gain and outweigh 
the gains of a trustful behavior. This notion unavoidably leads to a line of thinking that's focused on 
avoiding exploitation by the bad actors and averting negative outcomes. Calculativeness becomes the 
central mechanism in explaining trust and behavior that surrounds it, according to economists and 
rational choice theorists (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Williamson, 1993) 
 
Calculative thinking leads to the question of trustworthiness, which has been one of the answers to the 
game of trust. A classic study by Henslin (1968) found that taxi drivers 
use a number of criteria such as sex, age, ethnicity, neighborhood and the person’s degree of sobriety 
in order to decide the trustworthiness of their passengers. This led to a number of studies into the 
trustworthiness indicators, for example, a study by McKnight et al. (1998) exploring the characteristics 
of benevolence, competence, honesty, and predictability.  Nonetheless, the relevance of such signals in 
sales and client acquisition has been doubted by Dasgupta (1988), who studied trust signaling in sales 
relationships, and concluded that ‘there is nothing which enables the honest salesman to distinguish 
himself from the dishonest one’ (p. 70). There is a significant exception to Dasgupta's finding: ‘no 
poisoner seeks to demonstrate his honesty by drinking from the poisoned chalice’ (Bacharach & 
Gambetta, 2001, p. 159). What this phrase means is that there are indeed certain characteristics that 
can't be faked. One example could be technical characteristics of a product that could be demonstrated 
by two competing salesmen: certain technical standards will enable one of them to prove himself being 
correct in assessing his offering as superior. Nonetheless, this argument explains trust away, bringing it 
to the territory of complete control where overwhelming evidence reduces the vulnerability and 
uncertainty to zero. 
 
Trustworthiness indicators do not always represent the rational approach to trust though. Some 
researchers such as David Lewis and Andrew Weigert (1985) have also explored the notion of 
emotional trust that relies on the notion of ‘I trust him because I like him’. A similar notion has been 
discovered by Gulati (1995) in an even broader sense: he states that familiarity breeds trust, whereas 
familiarity is defined as favorable previous ties between actors. In the same vein, Lorenzen (1998) 
described how trust is often facilitated by communities with common rules and history. 
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Another famous rational explanation of trust explored by a number of researchers is the 'shadow of the 
future’ (Axelrod, 1984; Gibbons, 2001; Granovetter, 1985; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). It states that the 
actors' awareness of the possibility of future interactions will decrease the number of bad acts in the 
anticipation of retribution. Axelrod studied 'prisoner's dilemma', a game analyzed by the game theory 
where players can either engage in trustful or exploitative behavior. If players both engage in a trustful 
behavior, the return on their actions will be higher than if they both engage in exploitative behavior. 
Exploitative behavior does bring big returns, but only if the other player was trusting. When the game 
is repetitive, 'the shadow of the future' nudges both players towards a more trustful behavior because 
they don't want the other to switch to an exploitative mode in the following rounds. One example of 
this principle in real life could be Airbnb startup, an online marketplace for booking accommodation 
from strangers. Airbnb instituted references that hosts and travelers can leave for each other to ensure 
that trust develops on the platform (Zervas et al., 2015). Hosts and travelers know that bad behaving 
will lead to negative references and the inability to engage in future transactions on the platform. 
 
Lastly, a notable rational approach to trust by Hollis (1998) considers that actors recognize their need 
to be a member of the community and that changing the question from 'What is good for me?' to 'What 
is good for us?' allows for the trust to emerge. This is somewhat related to the 'shadow of the future' in 
a specific context. Hollis uses the same prisoner's dilemma game to show that if we were to look for 
the best collective outcome for us then it is clearly trusting behavior that becomes an answer. For 
Hollis, this argument is primarily about the drive to be part of the community, as long as the 
community doesn't deny the right to individual identity and freedom. 
 
To sum up on the rational views on trust, according to Möllering (2006), there may be an element of 
reason in all trust, but trust as such can not be explained solely by rationality and that rational trust 
theory runs into paradoxes. ‘If one trusts another, because there are incentives for the other to be 
trustworthy, then the vulnerability to exploitation is removed which gives trust its very meaning’ 
(James, 2002, p. 291). Möllering concludes that perhaps non-rational trust should be distinguished 
from the rational acts of cooperation. It seems that, as per Möllering's model, rationality isn't the full 
explanation of trust, nor can it be excluded as a part of explaining how trust forms and always being 
taken into account. Actors look for rational and non-rational reasons to trust. Information though often 
is not available. Therefore, when they collect a certain amount of evidence, actors make the leap of 
faith trusting that their hypothesis will turn out to be true. 
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Let's continue with the second pillar of Möllering's (2006) trust model, trust as routine. The core 
concept in enabling trust as a routine is its institutionalization, such that trust becomes taken for 
granted. Institutional trust is studied by researchers in this context as a system of rules and meanings, 
not a third-party guarantor or enforcer as it would be looked at in rational trust theory (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1986). An example to explain this concept would be that people trust others 
because they are aware that there is, in theory, state police and a lot of other diligent citizens who can 
protect them not because they have one hundred percent certainty that police will show up within a 10 
minutes after their call. 'In theory' is a key remark here because quite often an actor could have never 
experienced a bad event and might not even know how to act if one were to happen: proving that their 
trust is based more on the system of rules and meanings surrounding the police, rather than confidence 
in a third-party guarantor. Moreover, actors make society and are made by society (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). Actors have agency and apply it to create institutions, but those institutions then, in 
turn, shape the actors themselves. Someone institutionalized the police force. And the police 
institution, the rules and meanings surrounding it started affecting the actors since the day it was 
founded. While, of course, the actors continue influencing the police institution too, and for example 
have the power to shut it down. 
 
In his paper, Möllering relies heavily on the established notion of embeddedness of trust (Meyer & 
Jepperson, 2000). Meyer and Jepperson write that both the trustor and the trustee are embedded into 
the social context which influences how they act. The authors question the free will of individual 
actors and say that actors' choices are socially constructed. This, in turn, questions the agency of the 
individual actors. Meyer and Jepperson talk about a number of features of individuals, organizations, 
and states that point to their embeddedness: isomorphism (similarities in structure), standardization 
(standardization of the formulations that define entities), decoupling (i.e. discourse and attitude being 
disconnected from behavior and decisions - global standardization that meets local constraints), 
structuration (increasing structure of the entities, in case of individuals - i.e. more thorough plans), and 
collective action. Let's give a few examples to explain these concepts in our context. People in both 
startups and corporate clients have specific structure and roles (CEO, CTO, Startup scout, Head of 
Innovation) that define how they collaborate with internal and external parties and stem from similar 
structures - isomorphism. The processes within and across organizations are standardized i.e. 
collaboration with any big client starts with a pilot - standardization. Most companies talk about 
sustainability nowadays, but not always those values are upheld in small interactions - decoupling. An 
example of structuration could be for example that over time companies developed complex processes 
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for innovation, startup collaboration and incubation. Lastly, all of the above enable lots of people to 
organize and come to huge tech conferences with similar goals, that's collective action.  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) studied 'institutional isomorphism', which they divided into coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphism. The concept of institutional isomorphism explains how 
institutions normalize, standardize and make structures of entities that surround them similar to each 
other. Coercive isomorphism relates to external pressure to conform as a way to preserve legitimacy. 
The old fairytale of the naked king tells of a king that was sold an invisible dress. In reality, there was 
no dress at all. Nonetheless, no one dared say to the king that he was naked because that would have 
undermined the legitimacy of the citizens. That's a coercive isomorphism in action. Mimicry refers to 
the imitation of the behavior of others. Using the same story of the naked king, no one dared to say 
anything because they didn't see anyone else speak up. Everyone was silent, which only reinforced the 
silence even further. As soon as one person speaks up - that allows others to mimic, but being the first 
is hard. That's the mimetic isomorphism in action. Normative isomorphism describes how institutions 
shape what is normal, thus framing the world of the actors in a certain way. In the naked king story's 
case, it was normal that you don't say to the king that he is wrong. The institution of monarchy 
constitutes that kings are above other citizens and, thus, can't be made fun of, at least not in public. 
That's the normative isomorphism in action. 
 
In order to promote trust, institutions have to be trusted. Thus, trust in the system has been explored by 
a number of researchers, especially in political science (Barber, 1983; Coleman, 1990; Dunn, 1988; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995; Sztompka, 1999; Warren, 1999). Luhmann (1979) writes that ‘the 
person trusting realizes his dependence on the functioning of a highly complex system which he 
cannot see through, although it is, in itself, capable 
of being seen through’, so that in effect the individual actor ‘has to continue trusting as though under 
compulsion to do so’ (p. 50). Luhmann (1988) also recognizes the social elements of the system trust 
where the actor assumes that everyone else trusts the system too. Another social element of system 
trust is that it depends on the representatives of the system that the trustor encounters. It's been shown 
that patients develop their trust or distrust towards medical institutions though their interactions with 
doctors and other representatives of these institutions (Brownlie & Howson, 2005; Lowe, 2005). 
 
The last of the three pillars of trust is what Möllering (2006) called reflexivity. In his own account, 
Möllering's concept of reflexivity is related to that of Giddens' (1994) 'active trust' and Zucker's (1986) 
'process-based trust' both of which describe trust as dynamic and dependent upon the actions of the 
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actors and the development of their relationship. A few authors name communication and information 
exchange, which are dynamic in their nature, as prerequisite factors for the development of trust 
(Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Another model that seems to describe the thinking 
behind reflexivity is an integrative model of organizational trust (Mayer et al., 1995). A defining 
feature of this model is that it starts with the assessment of the factors of perceived trustworthiness and 
ends with a certain outcome of trusting behavior, which then feeds back to the factors of perceived 
trustworthiness creating a loop of trust. 
 
 
 
Understandable feature of the reflexivity of trust is that it builds slowly, step by step. ‘Social exchange 
relations evolve in a slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little 
trust is required because little risk is involved and in which both partners can prove their 
trustworthiness, enabling them to expand their relationship and engage in major transactions. Thus, the 
process of social exchange leads to the trust required for it in a self-governing fashion’ (Blau, 1968, p. 
454). The concept is also referred to as the ‘principle of gradualness’ (Luhmann, 1979). Another 
interesting feature of the reflexivity of trust is that trouble has been found to also contribute to the 
trust-building and not necessarily being detrimental, allowing the actors to prove their trustworthiness 
(Six, 2005).  
 
Figure 2 – Integrative model of organizational trust (Mayer et al., 1995). 
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Now that we've looked at the trust literature, let's sum up the findings that are relevant for our research 
question of why potential clients might be more likely to trust new entrepreneurs at tech conferences 
and events.  
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4 THE ROLE OF TRUST IN CLIENT ACQUISITION 
 
Let's look at what we learned and how it impacts our understanding of the research question. The 
notion of the leap of faith and optimistic, positive expectations as a precursor of trust is very 
interesting in a startup and entrepreneurship context since optimism is recognized as a primary 
characteristic of business owners (Cassar, 2010; De Meza, 2002). Welter (2012) also notes the 
similarity: 'When pursuing entrepreneurial activities and trusting, individuals deal with the unknown; 
when acting entrepreneurially, we do not know whether we will achieve the intended results; and when 
trusting, we do not know whether the persons in whom we trust will be worthy of it.' This means that 
at least on the side of entrepreneurs trustfulness can be very common, which could contribute to the 
trust of potential clients. Nonetheless, this notion doesn't affect our comparison of how trust affects 
client acquisition at tech conferences, in cold calling or social media as entrepreneurs participate and 
remain common denominators in all three of those channels. 
 
Another interesting factor of the interaction of trust and entrepreneurship is the principle of 
gradualness that we explored when talking about the reflexivity of trust. This principle mirrors the 
startup-corporate collaboration well: in the vast majority of cases, such relationships start with a pilot 
project, which is a project that has small costs or is free and enables the client to try out the product. 
Another finding worth highlighting is that mistakes during pilots don't undermine trust in themselves 
but actually serve as a test for the trustee. This could play well for startups since mistakes in the early 
stages of product development are a given. These findings, though, also don't contribute much to our 
understanding of the client acquisition itself. 
 
What then are the factors that could explain a trustful attitude towards new startup entrepreneurs at the 
conferences and tech events? The institutional trust could very well be the most significant influence 
on many startup-corporate interactions, especially at conferences and tech events. Studies show that 
institutional trust contributes to entrepreneurship and economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Lane, 
1997; Özcan and Bjørnskov, 2011; Welter, 2012; Zak & Knack, 2001). This is explained primarily by 
the fact that trust promotes business and startups are perceived as a risky business, thus they especially 
depend on trust. At events, notable is the influence applied to potential clients. Coercive isomorphism 
and mimicry might be making corporate representatives to come to tech conferences, to showcase how 
innovative they are, to engage in startup relationships. A related concept is one of social 
embeddedness, which undoubtedly also plays a role in client acquisition processes for startups. A 
group of researchers (Mitchell et al., 2002) described that entrepreneurs from eleven countries shared a 
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common culture that was distinct from the beliefs of the non-entrepreneurs. Perhaps normative 
isomorphism at tech conferences helps to bring corporate clients along for the ride with startup hype, 
dark conference buildings with neon lights, epic stages and performances, and overly optimistic 
entrepreneurs with their unrealistic ventures. DiMaggio (1988) and a number of others studied the role 
of 'institutional entrepreneur' as an important influence on such processes of institutionalization: 'New 
institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in 
them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly’ (p. 14; see also Beckert, 1999; Garud et 
al., 2002; Munir & Phillips, 2005). Fukuyama (1995) introduced the concept of high-trust and low-
trust environments, where both are self-reinforcing and high-trust environments, among other things, 
foster productive entrepreneurship. Fukuyama described 'trust clusters' where a large number of actors 
have trust relationships between each other that are qualitatively different from the average 
relationships outside the cluster. Such clusters can be represented at different levels of granularity 
(country, region, sector, organization) and vary across them (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2006). An example that can help to illustrate the concept is an NGO that the author used to 
be affiliated with called AIESEC. The defining feature of that network is the high-trust environment 
inside the network. When alumni of AIESEC meet, even if they know nothing about each other, they 
are likely to trust each other only due to a common alma mater. This could mean that one of the most 
important roles of the institutional entrepreneurs behind the tech conferences and events is to enable 
and build a high-trust environment. 
 
Another interesting aspect of institutional trust that's relevant to our research question is trust in the 
system. While most of the startups fail, the corporate actors have seen startups being around for a 
couple of decades already and, even though their immediate experience might be negative, they must 
act with the faith that they will encounter the unicorns that media preaches about. And startup media is 
the loudest at tech conferences and events, which also partly explains why those could be more 
effective channels of client acquisition than cold calls or social media. 
 
As we've been paying special attention to conferences and events as contexts for building trust, it is 
interesting to take a look at the added benefits of face-to-face interactions for the emergence of trust. 
Wilson et al. (2006) showed that while eventually, trust reaches similar levels, it starts higher in face-
to-face teams. A number of researchers have shown the benefits of face-to-face interactions for trust 
development (Burt & Knez, 1996; Wichman, 1970). Behavioral clues, facial expressions and voice 
tone reveal intentions and thus help to build trust, and face-to-face interactions enable those (Frank, 
1993, p. 165; Orbell & Dawes, 1991). Interpersonal trust is based on the social information which is 
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less readily available online (Zucker, 1986). Möllering (2006) presented emotional trust (i.e. ‘I trust 
him because I like him’) mostly as the evidence of paradoxes in the rational theory and as a tool to 
rescue actors from the 'dilemmas and dysfunctional social paralysis'. Nonetheless, emotional trust and 
trustworthiness indicators might have a noteworthy relationship with startup sales and client 
acquisition at conferences and events. In such events, startup representatives give corporate clients a 
better chance to evaluate themselves in the face to face interaction, which could lead to a faster 
emergence of trust by providing potential clients more information to base their decisions on. In 
comparison, cold calling offers fewer opportunities to communicate emotion and trustworthiness 
indicators. Face-to-face interactions enable trust and might be a clue as to why startups could have an 
easier time selling face-to-face at tech conferences than via cold calls.  
 
Institutional trust and the face-to-face nature of tech events don't fully explain how trust is formed so 
quickly at tech conferences, without any prior history of interaction between the parties. My own 
startup has had an experience of for example meeting a huge American film studio with multi-billion 
revenues at the conference in Helsinki on Friday and then signing a pilot deal with them the following 
Tuesday. How can a 20-minute meeting lead to such results? Perhaps one concept in trust literature 
that we haven't explored yet could come to rescue: 'swift trust'. 
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5 SWIFT TRUST: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
So far we've seen that trust could play an important role in many entrepreneurial relationships and 
especially at tech conferences and events. These conferences constitute a special case because trust 
tends to form rather quickly there, and accounts of signing deals within days are not unusual. That's 
why next we shall look at the concept of 'swift trust' developed by Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer 
(1996) and see if it could explain certain elements of such quick instances of the client acquisition.  
 
Meyerson et al. (1996) studied temporary work groups and found that trust that develops quickly 
between the team members of such groups is different from the trust in its traditional understanding. 
Robert et al. (2009) compared knowledge-based-trust developed through interactions and swift trust 
developed prior to interaction and concluded that the two are formed through fundamentally different 
processes. Meyerson et al. divided swift trust into having cognitive and normative elements. Cognitive 
elements emphasize the beliefs in the other party's trustworthiness and make swift trust fragile, or 
withdrawn readily at the first sign of trouble (Cramton, 2001; Griffith, et al., 2003; Watson-Manheim 
et al., 2012). Normative elements then refer to 'active, proactive, enthusiastic generative style of 
interaction between the system members' (Meyerson et al., 1996, pp. 180–187). Norms provide 
guidelines for what is acceptable behavior within a team and can be both explicit and implicit. The 
authors argue that swift trust hinges upon the team members' belief in the team's capability and 
competence. Thus actions that violate norms and assumptions about the competent behavior of the 
team erode swift trust. This increases the importance of team members' actions and how they use their 
agency in swift trust. Swift trust 'is not so much an interpersonal form as it is a cognitive and action 
form' (Meyerson et al., 1996, p. 191). 
 
Meyerson et al. (1996) distinguished a number of causes for a swift trust formation, prior to the 
interaction: contractor's reputation, reputations of the team members themselves, interdependence, role 
clarity, category-driven processing, and the context. 'Contractor' is the person assembling the work 
group, who often knows all the team members. This thus is similar to the factors of social 
embeddedness we discussed earlier. The same mechanism has been documented previously and can be 
explained simply as 'if Bob trusts him, I trust him' (Burt & Knez, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). Robert et al. 
(2009) called it 'third-party recommendation–based trust' (p. 245). Unsurprisingly, if we look at client 
acquisition in the B2B space, references often play a crucial role in every sales process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Another factor influencing the emergence of swift trust is the reputation of the team members 
themselves. This is similar to the previously mentioned concept of the 'shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 
1984; Gibbons, 2001; Granovetter, 1985; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Meyerson et al. (1996) wrote that in 
most cases the reputation of the team members is often at stake alongside their prospects for 
involvement in future projects. This factor could get fueled even further by the tight-knit community of 
people who know each other, as, for example, in an entrepreneurship community in Finland. Finland is 
a relatively small country and thus the business circles are quite small, making entrepreneurship 
community an even smaller group of people who are probably connected to each other at least as 
second-degree connections. 
 
Meyerson et al. (1996) also highlighted the importance of the interdependence of the temporary work 
group members as an important factor. The idea is that the fate of the team in interdependent and thus 
leaves team members no other choice but to trust others if they want to succeed. The authors mention 
that presuming that others are trustworthy often leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy. This notion of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy is similar to Möllering's (2006) concept of the leap of faith. 
 
Another big influential factor for swift trust is role clarity (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999). ‘If people in 
temporary systems deal with one another more as roles than as individuals … then expectations should 
be more stable, less capricious, more standardized, and defined more in terms of tasks and specialities 
than personalities’ (Meyerson et al., 1996, p. 173). Role-based trust is a heuristic or a rule of thumb 
based on the team member's role and can be simplified as 'she is an accountant, she must be good with 
numbers' (Bettencourt et al., 2001). A noteworthy parallel with tech conferences and events is that at 
such events participants get different badges: 'startup', 'executive', 'investor', 'attendee', 'student'. It 
might seem like a minor detail, but a startup representative with the badge 'attendee' or 'student' might 
raise suspicion.  
 
In the same chapter, Meyerson et al. (1996) mentioned that innovators might be discriminated based 
on their behavior outside the defined role. It could be interesting to explore if startup communities and 
specifically tech conferences and events normalize such idiosyncratic behavior and make it something 
corporate representatives appreciate, look out for and trust, not something they avoid. 
 
Meyerson et al. (1996) described a mechanism they called category-driven information processing. 
The authors explained that under the circumstances of lack of personal knowledge and the pressure to 
start working and produce results fast the team members resort to the categorization of the other 
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people, often based on stereotypes. The trust is then derived based on how much individuals trust other 
members from the same category (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Lea et al., 1992).  
 
McKnight et al. (1998) developed a theory that category-based processing promotes favorable in-
group ‘‘prototype-based’’ beliefs and actions (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Terry, et al., 1999; Tyler & 
Blader, 2001). Self-categorization processes have been found to generate high initial trust perceptions 
(Polzer et al., 2006; Robert et al., 2009). Zolin et al. (2004) have also found support that actors with 
high early trusting beliefs will notice evidence that confirms their team's competence and will tend to 
miss information that speaks of the contrary. Interestingly, ad hoc factors such as shirt colors can also 
influence categorization (Oakes & Turner, 1980). That might mean that instances such as events give 
actors more opportunities to categorize each other and startups are often proud of jeans and branded t-
shirts as a source of startup identity, and those can't be seen during calls. 
 
Lastly, Meyerson et al. (1996) noted that context disproportionally influences swift trust, although the 
question wasn't explored in-depth. Indeed, it seems like one of the most important factors for the 
emergence of swift trust could be institutional trust. Robert et al. (2009) described rule-based trust 
along the same lines as institutional trust and mentioned subcomponents like 'the situational normality 
and organizational/team structures, explicit and tacit understandings regarding transaction norms, 
interaction routines, and exchange practices' (p. 245). People start thinking more about being 
freelancers once it becomes commonplace to be one with the rise of the gig economy (Friedman, 
2014). The same way tech conferences could be playing a big role in making it normal for corporations 
to buy from startups by making these transactions visible. 
 
Robert et al. (2009) mentioned one more factor as a contributor to the emergence of swift trust: 
dispositional-based trust (also called propensity to trust). Disposition to trust is a tendency of certain 
people to be more trustful than others. Robert and colleagues noted that while sometimes referred to as 
a personality trait (Mayer et al., 1995), the disposition to trust is rather a general tendency resulting 
from past experiences (McKnight et al., 1998; Rotter, 1967; Rotter 1971; Rotter, 1980). Negative 
consequences of trusting behavior can be quite rare and yet concentrated for a few unlucky individuals. 
It is unsurprising then that their experience would teach those individuals engaging in trusting behavior 
less. This could explain the existence of people with different propensity to trust even if they come 
from the same environment. Robert et al. (2009) stated that alongside category-based processing 
disposition to trust was the most significant factor for the development of swift trust. The authors 
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wrote that once an individual gains personal knowledge about the behavior of other team members, the 
disposition to trust becomes a less significant factor.  
 
It is important to note that perceived risk plays an important role in how easily trust can be formed 
(Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). If I stand to lose more by trusting you and being wrong, I 
am less likely to trust. Perceived risk is partly an environmental factor, heavily dependent on the 
environment, outside of the inherent attributes of the actors (Mayer et al., 1995). Perceived risk is 
situational and is connected to the assessment of potential losses and gains by the actor (Bierman et al., 
1969). My trust in the same person would change depending on whether I trust her with the keys from 
my house or my phone. Mayer et al. (1995) pointed out that the calculation in the mind of an actor is 
the following: if the level of trust is higher than the perceived level of risk, the actor will engage in the 
trusting behavior and accept the risks. This, once again, is a good justification for the 'let's do a pilot 
first' approach in the startup-corporate collaboration. 
 
In terms of the later stages of the relationships based on swift trust, Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1999) 
provided a contribution. While in most cases swift trust starts with the category-driven information 
processing and categorical social structures, at the later stages trust is maintained by actions, which 
further increase the team's belief in the feasibility of success (Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004). Moreover, it 
has been argued that the earlier stage factors of trust disposition and in-group bias stop being 
significant at the later stages when the reflexivity of trust has kicked off (Robert et al., 2009). It is 
unclear when swift trust stops being swift trust and converts into the 'normal' trust, and it might very 
well be that that is exactly what the research mentioned above describes: the process of transformation 
from the swift trust to 'normal' trust. 
 
To sum up, it seems like swift trust in combination with institutional trust can be a big part of why tech 
conferences and events might work well as acquisition channels. In the last chapter, we have explored 
institutional trust. Here we have seen that institutional trust and the specific context might lead to the 
emergence of swift trust, which allows the parties to start trusting each other much quicker. Tech 
conferences enable many elements of swift trust. For example, Category-based trust is reflected in 
clear categories of startups and corporates coming to the events, and normative trust is established by 
the tech events and the rules and norms surrounding them. This is why swift trust and institutional trust 
seem to be the biggest factors contributing to the appeal of tech conferences and events as a client 
acquisition channel for young startup ventures. Next, let's try to see if these insights are backed up by 
empirical experiences. 
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6 AUTHOR’S PERSPECTIVE AS A STARTUP ENTREPRENEUR 
 
I previously briefly mentioned my empirical experience of the effectiveness of startup conferences and 
tech events. Let me provide some more background for the reader to understand better where I and my 
company are coming from.  
 
I am the CEO of a Helsinki-based startup Panda Training, which was founded in March 2016. I wrote 
my Bachelor's thesis about the beginnings of the company (Syrotkin, 2017). In short, I was working as 
a trainer for a global student-led NGO AIESEC and, having a network in training circles, have heard 
the same idea from two different sources. One was my future co-founder who shared his idea of a 
coaching marketplace with me, the other was a group of trainer friends talking about a marketplace for 
training. Thinking about these ideas for a bit I realized that it's both something that I believed had great 
potential and something I was able to execute with my skills. I talked to my future co-founder and, 
having settled on a B2B training marketplace, we co-founded the company.  
 
The idea was to create a marketplace for corporate training where corporate clients could easily get in 
touch and purchase training from training providers. We found a CTO from my network and started 
hunting for investment and getting initial pilot clients. Many potential clients told us that the idea was 
brilliant and that they were interested, but since we didn't have the product yet they couldn't buy 
anything. We eventually managed to get 80.000 EUR from the bank as a loan backed up by family and 
friends, plus the Finnish government grant of 50.000 EUR. Once we eventually shipped a prototype 
after summer, clients backed off. Suddenly their interest evaporated and they didn't want to sign up 
even for a cheap pilot.  
 
To make matters worse, before this happened, pleased with the initial 'market validation' and taking 
into account a summer vacation in Finland, we went to conquer the US and New York in July. Our 
usual client acquisition tactic in Finland was cold calling. Too bad only upon arrival to New York we 
realized that cold calling doesn't work there. In Finland you can just call the CEO of Nokia, in New 
York, you would have to go through 5 gatekeepers (lower-level managers who pick up the phone on 
behalf of their boss and ask you a lot of questions about why you are calling) and even then no one 
would pick up unless you are an existing contact in the phone book. We ended up having a business 
trip filled with anxiety and a semblance of vacation and came back earlier than planned. These events 
led to some of the biggest lessons from that period: interest doesn't mean purchase, and expanding too 
early, especially to the US, is quite foolish. 
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Even after selling to a couple of unfortunate clients we realized that the product has many concerns. 
First of all, even despite our filters, customers were lost in 400 trainer profiles. One of our 
accomplishments was signing up so many trainers. One of the keys there was a couple of very popular 
LinkedIn articles (that popularity of 2 of my articles has yet been unmatched by me in dozens of other 
articles), another successful tactic was the pure quantity of connection requests towards trainers on 
LinkedIn. Nonetheless, it was hard to differentiate between all the trainers or trust the system in 
arbitrary evaluations of trainers' quality. Furthermore, we realized that finding trainers was not at all a 
need for our clients. Finding good trainers is what was truly hard, and the root of that was knowing 
which training worked and which didn't.  
 
All this was happening during the span of the year, and we ballooned in the number of employees. Bit 
by bit we churned through a lot of interns, and a few people stayed with us. At our peak, we were 12 
people. Except for the founders, we had two salespeople, a marketing manager, a community manager, 
and 5 developers, which even included iOS mobile app development - a 'wise' investment in the future. 
Most of the people weren't highly qualified in what they were doing, being paid the lowest wages. Of 
course, as every respectable startup we had our board of advisors, too. This was another huge learning 
for us: we were going big with only a false promise of a demand. All this was painful when we ran out 
of money and had to fire people one by one. And money ran out fast. Have seemingly so much on the 
account you start spending like crazy only later to realize how the expenses quadruple and money goes 
down the drain with the speed of light. 
 
One year in, after the company has essentially collapsed, it was only I left and I still continued to work 
on the idea. I believe that even though we didn't get the product right, the need was there and the vision 
of "bringing corporate education to the next level" is still justified. I thought to try taking a narrower 
approach and instead of building a full-blown marketplace, build a marketplace for emerging 
technologies (Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, Internet of Things), which were hyped quite a bit 
back then. I somehow managed to recruit a reasonably big team of interns-volunteers who were ready 
to work on commission or getting paid only if we get revenue. All in all, spending another half a year 
on that, we came to the conclusion that this approach didn't work either. 
 
That is when in one of the conversations with my first co-founder I came to the realization that perhaps 
the key to everything was not in finding trainers through the marketplace, but finding especially good 
trainers, and even knowing what good training is. We thought that we could pivot to evaluating 
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corporate training. We would collect feedback from the training participants through questionnaires, 
both straight after the training and some months after and try to measure both the immediate effects of 
the training and the long-term impact. In the future, the initial idea was to turn the evaluation data back 
into a marketplace, but one where the key was in comparing the trainers based on their effectiveness 
and the training evaluation metrics that we developed. This time around we decided to stay lean and 
only brought on board one more person, social psychologist, and data analyst who we needed for 
delivering the service and who joined as the third founder. 
 
We continued with the good old cold calling as our primary channel for client acquisition. Things we 
going a lot better than in our first iteration. We even got our first big client: Bayer, a German chemical 
corporation. We helped them to evaluate their digital transformation trainings on Office 365 that were 
rolled out to 1000 employees around Nordics and Baltics. Despite this big win, sales still felt like 
pushing a huge boulder up the mountain. Many companies already had some sort of evaluation 
practices, and even though ours could have been superior, it didn't seem important enough to change 
the system. We also had a huge churn of the pilot customers, many of them not actively requesting 
new projects with us. Of course, in comparison to the first iteration, at least we had clients. We weren't 
rich by far but could pay ourselves modest salaries without any investment.  
 
Except for just the sales concerns, we had a bunch of concerns about our methodology itself. First of 
all, it relied on the self-assessment of the employees. Second, our data samples were often very small. 
Third, the rigorous standards for evaluation were near impossible to develop due to survey fatigue and 
the fact that we can only ask 10 questions, not 100. Also, we were concerned about scalability as one 
of the founders was doing all the work for the clients and we were not sure if we were able to automate 
the process. Most important of all though, we found out that corporate training itself, for the most part, 
is done well enough. The problem in training effectiveness mostly comes to be caused by what comes 
after the training. Lack of follow up, getting back to a familiar environment, the hard reality of 
building new habits and changing behavior all lead to only 15% of participants applying the 
knowledge they acquired at the training to their work. That was especially true for soft skills trainings, 
where the application was harder than with hard skills like learning a new programming language that 
you can apply immediately in your work. We ended up in a position where we would report these 
problems to our clients, but we could rarely do anything about them. As a result, our reports had a 
minimal tangible impact on the everyday work of the companies and thus produced only minimal 
value. 
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Even though we had one loyal client from the IT industry who we serve until this day, one year into 
the execution of the training evaluation idea we realized that we had to find a way to transition the 
business into some other direction. The insight came from something we've been thinking for a bit. A 
chatbot to collect the data from the participants instead of a questionnaire, which no one likes. The 
idea was that the chatbot could also help participants implement the lessons of the training easier, i.e. 
by helping them set goals. Slowly we realized that training effectiveness might be the primary, not the 
secondary problem we want to solve. We started planning a pilot of the chatbot to help people reflect 
and set goals with one of our most loyal customers, who were open to experiments. At first, the idea 
was to have a human who writes pre-scripted text as if he is the chatbot so that we wouldn't need to 
hire any developers. Sometimes this way of doing things is called a Wizard of the Oz method, where 
you imitate automation with human work at the early stages of development in order to test the 
business model with low costs. We were afraid though that the chatbot would not provide sufficient 
value. After some consideration, we decided to ditch the chatbot idea and instead go for full-blown 
human-led coaching, albeit done through text in Teams or Slack to save the time and energy of the 
coach. This is how the idea of micro-coaching was born. 
 
Micro-coaching was first a service that was provided as a follow up on training programs to help 
participants apply lessons in practice. The coaching happened through the company's internal 
communication software like Teams of Slack to avoid face to face interactions and thus drain the 
coach less, allowing the coach to handle more coachees at a time. The current estimate is that through 
the micro-coaching framework one coach can work with 50 people per week, which is a big jump from 
traditional 10-20. There was another unexpected benefit of doing coaching via text. We were able to 
collect high-quality qualitative data about the companies' culture and processes. Seeing this data as 
valuable we decided to anonymize it and deliver it as an additional part of the service providing extra 
value for the clients.  
 
Slowly we got access to a few bigger clients (i.e. Universal Pictures in Los Angeles headquarters) and 
started working more on the side of change management rather than only training follow up. There the 
idea was to support middle managers in implementing the changes in their teams, often supporting 
them in time management prioritization, communication. It is still very early to say more, but this 
iteration of Panda Training definitely was the most successful so far. In the year 2019, we made 50.000 
EUR revenue, which is very modest, but still enough to give two full-time and one part-time founder a 
'student' salary.  
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What is perhaps the most interesting in the context of this thesis is that more than 90% of our clients 
came from tech conferences and events. Some examples of these conferences are Slush, Arctic15, 
Nordic Business Forum, SHIFT, Stream. We were attending the conferences in the earlier iterations of 
Panda Training too, but our primary client acquisition channel for the training marketplace and the 
training evaluation products had been cold calling. That changed slowly. First times around, we didn't 
even know that much about matchmaking apps at the tech events that allow participants to schedule 
meetings beforehand. One example of such an app popular in Finland is Brella. Then, as it was 
positioned in many events, we started using it for booking meetings with investors as we were, quite 
unsuccessfully, trying to raise money back then. While working on the training evaluation product I 
also managed to book a couple of meetings with potential clients or corporate venture funds. That's 
how we got some of our most loyal customers. Starting with micro-coaching we made a decision that 
we are not raising money as long as we can and that the primary focus during tech conferences should 
be on booking meetings with clients. Slowly this led us to treat conferences as our main client 
acquisition channel where we have a calendar of upcoming European events and the first thing we 
check when finding a new one is whether they have Brella or similar matchmaking application. 
 
A surprising insight is that traditionally tech conferences have been positioning meetings as the 
connection point for startups and investors (sometimes, corporate investors, but investors nonetheless). 
Indeed, at least my observation is that many startups heavily underutilize the matchmaking at 
conferences and spend a lot of time meeting investors but often almost none meeting potential clients.  
 
That being said, why did conferences work out so well for us? This is what I would like to analyze 
next.  
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7 ANALYSIS 
 
After doing the extensive reading on trust it is evident that trust plays a significant role in why 
conferences might facilitate better and more efficient client acquisition for startups and new ventures 
founded by young entrepreneurs. I came to such a conclusion because (1) trust has been shown to play 
an important role in sales and customer acquisition (Dwyer et al., 1987; Hawes et al., 1989; Prus, 
1989; Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Swan & Nolan, 1985), and because (2) I have found many instances 
(which will be explored one by one next) where theory shows us that trust with the potential clients is 
very likely to be easier to develop for young entrepreneurs at tech conferences than elsewhere. 
 
The context is, perhaps, the key. As we have seen in previous chapters, there are a variety of theories 
that emphasize the importance of context. Some examples would be Möllering's (2006) routine trust, 
Meyer and Jepperson's (2000) embeddedness into the social context, Zucker's (1986) and DiMaggio 
and Powell's (1991) framework of institutional trust, Berger and Luckmann's (1966) notion that actors 
both make society and are made by society, and, last but not the least, Meyerson et al.'s (1996) 
statement that context disproportionally influences swift trust. Tech conferences and events create the 
context for the conversation between corporate and the young entrepreneurs without reputation or 
connections. Context is a big driving force behind the emergence of swift trust (Meyerson et al., 1996) 
and is also interrelated with institutional (or 'routine') trust. When you meet someone at a tech 
conference as a startup you are suddenly not just a nobody, you are a representative of the community 
that gave birth to Google, Apple, Facebook, and other tech giants. More than that, tech conferences 
create an atmosphere of hype. If you were to attend Slush, it might look very strange: it's loud, neon 
lights are everywhere and it is dark, the event space is huge, the light shows are amazing, the smartest 
entrepreneurs on Earth are on stage all around you, and everyone is excited. In such an environment it 
is hard not to get excited about the future. And that is exactly what startups sell - a better future. Tech 
conferences institutionalize excitement. 
 
Many elements of swift trust are positively impacting the connections at tech conferences. A startup 
and a corporate representative both attending the same event suddenly put them into the same 
'category' of people who attend tech conferences. Extensive studies have shown that category-based 
processing is essential to swift trust (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Lea et al., 1992; 
McKnight et al., 1998; Meyerson et al., 1996; Polzer et al., 2006; Robert et al., 2009; Terry, et al., 
1999; Tyler & Blader, 2001). People like other people who are similar to them and tech events allow 
startup entrepreneurs with zero background to suddenly have something in common with the Chief 
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Innovation Officers of huge corporates like Nokia, Siemens, KONE and many more. Not only that, but 
category-based processing also works to showcase young and unknown entrepreneurs as part of the 
same tribe that is often represented in the media by the Unicorns or companies with a billion-dollar 
valuation. Companies like Stripe, Zynga, Airbnb, and Uber all wear jeans, t-shirts, and hoodies with 
their logo and slogans about changing the world and even such seemingly subtle symbols have been 
shown to affect category-based processing (Oakes & Turner, 1980). Have you ever seen corporate 
representatives wearing t-shirts that announce how their company will change the world? At tech 
events, even executives do that. And all the young nascent entrepreneurs do so too. Conferences allow 
them to dress up and showcase that in real life. It is hard to show that you are 'cool' via a cold call only 
with your shaky voice and engineering background.  
 
Role clarity plays a significant role in building swift trust (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1999; Meyerson et al., 1996) and is in effect here, too. Not only do startups and corporate 
executives have badges with different colors, but their intents are also well defined, too. If you are a 
startup attending a huge tech conference, it means you mean business. You aim to pitch on stage, 
attract investors, scale and take over the world. If you are a corporate executive attending a tech 
conference, it means that you are open to innovate. You realize that impending doom that is upon you 
and you are ready to take the necessary action to break free. The tools might differ, but corporates that 
attend tech conferences aim to cooperate with startups in one way or another (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015). Be it corporate venture capital, acquisition, being a client, or something else. Corporate 
representatives at tech conferences are on the hunt, they are open-minded, and they are ready to buy. 
And that makes both startup entrepreneurs and executives realize their interdependence. 
Interdependence is another crucial factor for swift trust. People realize that they are 'in the same boat' 
and are ready to make the leap of faith way faster and easier than they would have otherwise. The 
leverage is suddenly not only on the side of the corporation that has all the money anymore. Both 
parties came to the conference, both parties have a certain need, and that need equalizes them in their 
discussions and makes it easier even for young entrepreneurs without any reputation to negotiate 
fairly. 
 
Tech conferences institutionalize and normalize risk-taking. Perceived risk is another crucial 
component of swift trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Bierman et al., 1969). The 
education at tech conferences and events is not only for startups, in some way it greatly influences 
corporations too. They hear case studies from top-notch entrepreneurs, they see the numbers of 
Unicorn companies and realize that anything is possible. They also see their colleagues. This creates a 
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small gamified community. Is our corporation more startup-friendly than yours? Can we show to our 
shareholders that we are innovative? Is our stand bigger? These are probably some of the questions 
that tech events nudge corporate executives to ask themselves. 
 
Tech conferences also connect people in a normative way. Alongside cognitive factors, normative ones 
are a big contributor to swift trust formation (Meyerson et al., 1996). At the tech conferences and 
events, we all have a badge, we all eat from the same biodegradable plates, we all adhere to the event's 
rules of conduct. These seemingly small norms are helpful for establishing swift trust. Having no 
experience young entrepreneurs might not know how to approach and executive and what language to 
use. At tech conferences and events, the stage is set, there are tools available for every kind of task or 
challenge, and there are plenty of examples all around. 
 
The last but not the least contributor to the swift trust in tech conferences and events is the shadow of 
the future, the fear of losing your reputation (Axelrod, 1984; Gibbons, 2001; Granovetter, 1985; 
Meyerson et al., 1996; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). The entrepreneurship community is quite small. Tech 
conferences and events make it even smaller. You see the same people over and over at the same 
events year-to-year. This creates a sense of familiarity, even if you don't know them all too well. 
Especially in a small country like Finland, everyone in the tech community is connected to everyone 
else as a 2nd or 3rd-degree connection. That raises the probability of catching the bad actors, which in 
turn makes everyone feel safer and more trustful. If you don't deliver on your promises, would you be 
able to show up to the event next year and be seen by all the people whose expectations you have 
betrayed? 
 
From a classical trust perspective, the sheer face-to-face nature of the conference engagements could 
also be a beneficial factor in building high-trust relationships. The benefits of face-to-face interactions 
on the development of trust have been extensively studied (Burt & Knez, 1996; Frank, 1993; Orbell & 
Dawes, 1991; Wichman, 1970; Wilson et al., 2006; Zucker, 1986). Seeing the person is somehow 
always more assuring, and the cold calls or social media don't have that advantage. 
 
We also shouldn't underestimate non-trust related factors that could contribute to the success of 
conferences as an effective customer acquisition channel. One recent technological innovation is 
responsible for a big chunk of the success of sales engagements at tech conferences and events. That 
innovation is called 'matchmaking apps'. These apps allow attendees to create a profile on the online 
platform, connect with other attendees and book meetings with each other. When they come to the 
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conference, the meeting is already scheduled not only with assigned time but also with a convenient 
place - usually, these are numbered tables in a specified matchmaking area. This makes both the 
outreach to potential clients and arranging meetings extremely easy and convenient. When preparing 
for a conference, I would go through all the profiles of people registered in the app and send 
invitations to everyone who seems relevant. It is easy to reach a lot of people with minimal time spent, 
and this game of numbers plays in favor of such conference engagements. Not all of the people would 
accept my meeting request. This is a natural filter that allows me to screen out people for whom our 
value proposition is not of interest and only meet those who are intrigued and already have some 
motivation to meet. In comparison, sometimes it is harder for people to say 'no' on the phone which 
could result in meetings that are useless for both parties. And the amount of meetings my startup is 
usually able to arrange at conferences is incredible. 20 meetings per day is a norm, with most 
conferences lasting for 2 days. With cold calling 40 meetings are usually hard to get even in 3 months.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The writing of this thesis started with an insight. Being a CEO of a Finnish startup I noticed that more 
than 90% of our clients came from tech conferences and events. I wanted to know why this happens, 
especially since I felt that the matchmaking meetings at conferences were underutilized by startups, 
focusing primarily on the investment search.  
 
First I looked at the client acquisition literature, which is scarce, especially in relation to the 
conferences as a client acquisition channel. Part of the reason for why that might be the case is the fact 
that the client acquisition aspect of conferences has been reinvented fairly recently with the arrival of 
matchmaking apps that allow relevant parties to connect before the conference and meet on an agreed 
date at the pre-assigned table. One study from 1988 has shown that conferences are a cheaper client 
acquisition channel than cold calls (Browning & Adams, 1988), but as said the scene has changed 
dramatically since then. A bunch of other client acquisition literature has focused on relationship 
marketing and the importance of long-term client relationships (Haas et al., 2012; Hohenschwert & 
Geiger, 2015; Weitz & Bradford, 1999), social media (Agnihotri et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017), and 
B2B marketing and sales fundamentals (Cortez & Johnston, 2017; Merrilees et al., 2011). The clues 
for the subject in question are few and far between. 
 
The trust literature was the next place to look into as trust was shown as a significant factor in the 
success of sales relationships. Relying primarily on Möllering's (2006) model I've looked at what 
forms trust and whether it can explain the sales success of the young startup entrepreneurs at the tech 
conferences. The main insight from this work is that institutional trust might be playing a 
disproportionally important role in client acquisition at tech conferences and events (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000; Meyerson et al., 1996; 
Möllering, 2006; Zucker, 1986). The environment created by tech events glorifies startup 
entrepreneurs almost as heroes, makes it normal for corporations to infuse innovation in their business 
by collaborating with startups, and simply makes it 'cool' to hang out with young people with bold 
ambitions who wear t-shirts plastered with logos of their companies in the light of neon lights. Another 
important factor is of course that face-to-face interaction is inherent to the conference experience, 
while it is not there in the cold calling (Burt & Knez, 1996; Frank, 1993; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; 
Wichman, 1970; Wilson et al., 2006; Zucker, 1986). 
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That being said, it seemed like something might be missing. How come does trust form so fast at tech 
conferences and events? Pre-arranged meetings often last 15-20 minutes yet some clients can sign the 
deal in a matter of days. What helped to resolve this dilemma was the concept of swift trust developed 
by Meyerson et al. (1996). These researches studied the phenomena of trust forming very quickly 
under special circumstances. And many of the factors can also be found in the brief connections and 
interactions at the tech conferences. Clarity of roles, facilitation of easy division of people into 
categories, interdependence, lower perceived risk, reputational risks, normative standards are some of 
them (Meyerson et al., 1996; Robert et al., 2009).  
 
Of course, there are also important non-trust factors involved, namely the fact that matchmaking apps 
make reaching out and arranging meetings with potential clients extremely easy. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is a call for more research into the effectiveness of tech conferences and 
events as well as matchmaking apps as client acquisition channels. It's necessary to acknowledge the 
limitations of this study. What I did essentially is taking a sample of one (experience from my startup 
Panda Training) and then seeing if the current literature backs up that incident and insight. That is why 
we need more empirical studies that could compare the effectiveness of conferences and tech events as 
the channels for client acquisition versus more traditional channels such as cold calling, and social 
media marketing.  
 
A practical application of this work can be drawn with caution. First of all, tech conferences and 
events can be more explicit about the utilization of matchmaking apps as vehicles to acquire clients 
and collect product feedback in B2B space. Secondly, the startups themselves should be more active 
on the matchmaking platforms and make a wise judgment whether they should watch a talk by a 
famous founder on stage (which will later be available to watch online) or try and meet as many 
potential clients as possible. 
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